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Abstract
A general model for cooperative games with possibly restricted and hi-
erarchically ordered coalitions is introduced and shown to have lattice struc-
ture under quite general assumptions. Moreover, the core of games with
lattice structure is investigated. Within a general framework that includes
the model of classical cooperative games as a special case, it is proved al-
gorithmically that monotone convex games have a non-empty core. Finally,
the solution concept of the Shapley value is extended to the general class of
cooperative games with restricted cooperation. It is shown that several gen-
eralizations of the Shapley value that have been proposed in the literature
are subsumed in this model.
1 Introduction
The standard model of a cooperative game (N, v) involves a ground set N of
players that are assumed to be free to form arbitrary coalitions S ⊆ N . The
function v represents the value v(S) generated when players cooperate in
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the coalition S . Often, however, cooperative games carry natural hierarchi-
cal structures which exclude certain coalitions from being feasible. It turns
out that solution concepts like the core are also meaningful in the context
of games with restricted cooperation (cf. [7]). In particular, games where
the restriction on the formation of coalitions results from some order or per-
mission structure on the set N have recently received attention (see, e.g.,
[8, 14, 9, 10, 11]) and have been extended to so-called convex geometries
and antimatroids (see [3, 1, 2]).
We introduce here a general model for cooperative games with dom-
inance relations on the collection of feasible coalitions, where we do not
need to start from a given relation on the set of players. We show that the
collection F of feasible coalitions has a lattice structure (in the strict sense)
under fairly mild assumptions and we proceed to define and analyze the
core of more general lattice-structured cooperative games. There has been
some recent progress in the algorithmic solution of linear programs over
so-called lattice polyhedra ([13, 5, 12]), which were introduced by Hoff-
man and Schwartz [15] as generalizations of (poly-)matroids (cf. [21]) or,
in game-theoretic language, convex cooperative games in the sense of Shap-
ley [20]. For example, it has been realized that the ”greedy algorithm” is
actually an algorithm that depends on a ”Monge algorithm” for a prepro-
cessing phase (cf. [9, 11]). Frank [13] has generalized the latter idea to
solve the corresponding minimization problem with monotone decreasing
convex constraints. We show how this general two-phase algorithm allows
us to compute core vectors in the present context (Section 4) in a far-reaching
generalization of Shapley’s [20] classical model.
We finally argue that also the solution concept of a ”Shapley value” ad-
mits a natural extension to the general framework here. We provide an al-
gorithmic definition for a Shapley value for general cooperative games and
point out how other generalized Shapley values for extensions of classical
cooperative games to partially ordered sets and convex geometries are sub-
sumed under our model.
2 Lattices of Feasible Coalitions
We assume throughout that the set N of players under consideration is finite
and that a collection F of feasible coalitions S ⊆ N is specified. The cru-
cial aspect in our model is that F is allowed to carry a (partial) order (F ,≤)
which might reflect a dominance relation among feasible coalitions. We as-
sume the dominance relation to be compatible with the natural set-theoretic
2
order on F in the following sense. For all feasible coalitions S, T, U ∈ F ,
we assume
(C1) S ≤ U ≤ T =⇒ S ∩ T ⊆ U .
Axiom (C1) stipulates that any player p ∈ S that is part of a dominat-
ing feasible coalition T is also a member of every feasible coalition U that
dominates S and is dominated by T .
We say that (F ,≤) is a weakly submodular lattice if (C1) holds and from
among the members of any two feasible coalitions S, T ∈ F feasible coali-
tions U and V can be formed that dominate S and T , resp. are dominated
by S and T :
(C2) U ≤ S, T ≤ V for some U, V ∈ F(S ∪ T ),
where we have used the notation F(X) = {S ∈ F | S ⊆ X} for any subset
X ⊆ N . Directly from the definitions, we find
Lemma 2.1 Assume that (F ,≤) is a weakly submodular lattice and let
X ⊆ N be arbitrary. Then either F(X) = ∅ or (F(X),≤) has a unique
maximal and a unique minimal member.
Proof. Suppose the Lemma is false and F(X) contains the maximal
members M1 6=M2, for example. Then (C2) guarantees some M ∈ F such
that
M1,M2 ≤M ⊆M1 ∪M2 ⊆ X and hence M ∈ F(X),
which contradicts the maximality of M1 and M2.

The particular choice X = N in Lemma 2.1 shows that (F ,≤) itself has
a unique maximal and a unique minimal element. We stress, however, that
the ”grand coalition” N need not be feasible or maximal in our model. For
example, the maximal element M in (F ,≤) may very well be a coalition
that consists of just one ”dictator” that dominates all other coalitions.
Proposition 2.1 Assume N ∈ F . Then N is the maximal element of (F ,≤)
if and only if the order (F ,≤) coincides with the set-theoretic order (F ,⊆):
S ≤ T ⇐⇒ S ⊆ T for all S, T ∈ F .
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Proof. If (F ,≤) = (F ,⊆), then N is obviously the maximal member of
F . Conversely, if N is maximal then any relation S ≤ T in (F ,≤) yields,
in view of (C1):
S ≤ T ≤ N and hence S = S ∩N ⊆ T.

2.1 Characteristic Functions
Relative to the collection F of feasible coalitions, a player p ∈ N gives rise
to the characteristic function χp : F → {0, 1}, where
χp(S) = 1 ⇐⇒ p ∈ S.
Let now S, T, U, V ∈ F be such that U ≤ S, T ≤ V . Property (C1)
guarantees
p ∈ U ∩ V =⇒ p ∈ S ∩ T.
In view of U, V ⊆ S ∪ T , we obtain the so-called submodular inequality
χp(U) + χp(V ) ≤ χp(S) + χp(T ). (1)
This is the reason why we refer to a coalition structure (F ,≤) with the
properties (C1) and (C2) as ”weakly submodular”.
Every vector x ∈ RN defines a function x : F → R via
x(S) =
∑
p∈S
x(p) =
∑
p∈N
x(p)χp(S) for all S ∈ F .
If x ≥ 0, all coefficients x(p) are nonnegative. Consequently, the func-
tion x : F → R+ is a nonnegative linear combination of the characteristic
functions χp, which means that the submodular inequality is preserved:
Lemma 2.2 If F is a weakly submodular lattice and x ≥ 0, then we have
for all coalitions S, T ∈ F and U, V ∈ F(S ∪ T ),
U ≤ S, T ≤ V =⇒ x(U) + x(V ) ≤ x(S) + x(T ).

REMARK. If F contains the empty set ∅ as its minimal element (which
is the case in practically all of the examples below), one may always choose
U = ∅ in (C2). Submodularity of the characteristic functions thus becomes
equivalent with the seemingly weaker property
For all S, T ∈ F , there is some V ∈ F(S ∪ T ) such that S, T ≤ V .
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2.2 Proper Lattices and Duality
A partially ordered set (F ,≤) is usually said to be a ”lattice” if F has a
unique minimal element and for each S, T ∈ F there exists a supremum, i.e.
a member S ∨ T ∈ F such that
V ≥ S, T =⇒ V ≥ S ∨ T for all V ∈ F .
Let us call such structures proper lattices in our context. Note that the supre-
mum S ∨T , if it exists, is unique. It is easy to see that a weakly submodular
lattice, as introduced earlier, is not necessarily a ”lattice” in this strict sense.
Lemma 2.1 yields a weak analog of the supremum property.
Example 2.1 Let N = {a, b, c, d} and consider the collection
F = {∅, {a}, {b}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}}
with dominance relation
∅ < {b}, {a, d} < {a, c}, {a, b} < {a}.
Then (F ,≤) is a weakly submodular lattice. Yet, (F ,≤) is not a proper
lattice since S = {a, d} and T = {b}, for example, do not have a (unique)
supremum S ∨ T relative to (F ,≤) (see Fig. 1).
{b}
{}
{a,d}
{a,c} {a,b}
{a}
Figure 1: A weakly submodular but not proper lattice.
An additional condition, which is often satisfied in practice, namely
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(C0) T > S =⇒ p ∈ T \ S for some p ∈ N ,
guarantees a weakly submodular lattice to be also a proper lattice. (C0)
stipulates that a coalition T ∈ F can only dominate the coalition S ∈ F if
T comprises at least one player p that is not already part of S.
Theorem 2.1 Assume that (F ,≤) satisfies (C0)-(C2) and let S, T, V ∈ F
be coalitions such that S, T ≤ V ⊆ S∪T holds. Then V is the unique mini-
mal coalition in F that dominates both S and T (and hence the supremum
S ∨ T ).
Proof. Consider any feasible coalition U ≥ S, T in F . We must show
that U ≥ V holds. Suppose this is not the case. So (C2) guarantees a
W ∈ F such that
S, T ≤ U < W ⊆ U ∪ V.
By (C0), we should be able to find some w ∈ W \ U . From (C1), we know
that w lies neither in S nor in T , i.e. w /∈ S ∪ T . Because of w ∈ U ∪ V ,
however, w /∈ U implies w ∈ V ⊆ S ∪ T , which is a contradiction.

REMARK (SINGULARITY OF DICTATORS). Suppose that the coalition
structure (F ,≤) satisfies (C0) and that the maximal coalition M represents
a dictator, i.e., M = {d}. Then d ∈ M \ S holds for all coalitions S 6= M ,
which means that d cannot be part of any other coalition.
Relative to (F ,≤) we define the dual order as the coalition structure
(F ,≤d), where for all S, T ∈ F ,
S ≤d T ⇐⇒ T ≤ S.
It is clear that property (C1) is preserved under (order) duality and so is
property (C2). In other words: (F ,≤) is a weakly submodular lattice if and
only if (F ,≤d) is a weakly submodular lattice.
NOTA BENE. Property (C0) is generally not preserved under duality.
Nevertheless, it is a well-known fact that (F ,≤) is a proper lattice if and
only if (F ,≤d) is a proper lattice.
2.3 Examples
The system F of sets is called a ring family if it is intersection and union
closed:
S, T ∈ F =⇒ S ∩ T, S ∪ T ∈ F .
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If F is a ring family, then (F ,⊆) satisfies (C0)-(C2) and hence is a proper
lattice with supremum operation S∨T = S∪T . Moreover, the characteristic
functions are modular with respect to intersection and union, i.e., satisfy the
submodular inequality with equality:
χp(S ∩ T ) + χp(S ∪ T ) = χp(S) + χp(T ). (2)
The standard model of cooperative games takes F as the collection of all
subsets of N , which obviously constitutes a ring family.
2.3.1 Precedence Constraints
The standard cooperative game model can be considerably extended if the
set N of players is allowed to carry a (partial) precedence ordering (N,≤)
(cf. [8, 9, 10]). Depending on the interpretation, a coalition S ⊆ N is now
”feasible” if S is an ideal in (N,≤), i.e., if
q ≤ p =⇒ q ∈ S for all p ∈ S and q ∈ N.
The collection I of ideals of (N,≤) is easily recognized as a ring family.
(I,⊆) thus is a proper lattice with modular characteristic functions.
In a related (but different) model only those subsets A ⊆ N are consid-
ered to form feasible coalitions in which no player p ∈ A is dominated by
another player q ∈ A. Those subsets are the so-called antichains of (N,≤).
Let A be the collection of antichains of (N,≤). A natural partial order
(A,≤) is induced by (I,⊆) as follows. Associate with any S ⊆ N the ideal
S = {q ∈ N | q ≤ p for some p ∈ S}
and set
A ≤ B ⇐⇒ A ⊆ B for all A,B ∈ A.
It is straightforward to check that (A,≤) enjoys the properties (C0) and
(C1). Moreover, denoting by max(S) the set of maximal elements of the set
S, the antichains A unionsqB = max(A ∪B) and A ∩B are contained in A ∪B
and satisfy A ∩B ≤ A,B ≤ A unionsqB. So property (C2) holds as well, which
tells us that the characteristics of (A,≤) are submodular (cf. (1) above). In
fact, the following modular equality
χp(A uB) + χp(A unionsqB) = χp(A) + χp(B)
holds relative to the operation A uB = max(A ∩B) in (A,≤) (see [17]).
NOTA BENE. A ∩ B ⊆ A u B ⊆ A ∪ B is true for all antichains
A,B ∈ A. However, A ∩B 6= A uB may be quite possible.
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2.3.2 Convex Geometries
As a further generalization of the coalition model for cooperative games so-
called convex geometries are suggested in [1, 2, 3]. Here a convex geometry
is an intersection closed collection F of subsets of N such that
(CG0) ∅, N ∈ F .
(CG1) For all S, T ∈ F either S ⊆ T or there exists some p ∈ S \ T such
that S \ {p} ∈ F .
Such structures were introduced in [6] as a discrete analog of convex sets
in Euclidean spaces. For example, the collection I of ideals relative to a
precedence order (N,≤) satisfies (CG0) and (CG1) and thus is a convex
geometry. The model of a convex geometry is more general, however. While
(F ,⊆) is a proper lattice with supremum operation
S ∨ T =
⋂
{U ∈ F | (S ∪ T ) ⊆ U},
S∨T 6= S∪T may happen, which means that (C2) cannot hold. In fact, it is
not difficult to check the validity of the following supermodular inequality:
χp(S ∩ T ) + χp(S ∨ T ) ≥ χp(S) + χp(T ),
which can be strict.
Assuming (F ,⊆) to be a convex geometry, consider any feasible coali-
tion S ∈ F . Geometrically speaking, a player p ∈ S is an extreme point of
S if and only if S \{p} ∈ F . It is readily proved (by induction, for example)
that a feasible set S ∈ F is uniquely determined by its set ext(S) of extreme
points and one finds
S =
⋂
{T ∈ F | ext(S) ⊆ T}. (3)
Generalizing the transition from ideals to antichains relative to prece-
dence orders, one could now argue that ext(S) is the set of the truly relevant
players in S. This would suggest to consider the collection
E = {ext(S) | S ∈ F}
of relevant coalitions with the induced order
ext(S) ≤ ext(T ) in (E ,≤) ⇐⇒ S ⊆ T in (F ,⊆).
Having noted that a convex geometry is not necessarily weakly submodular,
the next result is perhaps a bit surprising.
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Proposition 2.2 If (F ,⊆) is a convex geometry, then the coalition structure
(E ,≤) has the properties (C0)-(C2) and hence is a lattice with submodular
characteristics.
Proof. (C0) is a direct consequence of (3). To see (C1), observe that the
extreme point property is preserved when one passes to a smaller coalition,
i.e. if S, T ∈ F are such that S ⊆ T and p ∈ S is an extreme point of T ,
then p is also an extreme point of S because
S \ {p} = S ∩ (T \ {p}) ∈ F .
Hence S ⊆ U ⊆ T implies ext(S) ∩ ext(T ) ⊆ ext(U). To verify (C2) let
S, T ∈ F be arbitrary and consider the set
V =
⋂
{W ∈ F | (ext(S) ∪ ext(T )) ⊆W} ∈ F .
Clearly, every p ∈ ext(V ) must lie in ext(S) ∪ ext(T ) as otherwise
ext(S) ∪ ext(T )) ⊆ V \ {p} ∈ F
would contradict the definition of V . So ∅ ∈ F yields the desired property
∅ ≤ ext(S), ext(T ) ≤ ext(V ) ⊆ ext(S) ∪ ext(T ).

3 The Core of a Cooperative Game
Let F be the collection of feasible coalitions relative to the set N of players
and assume throughout that the properties (C1) and (C2) hold relative to
a given partial order (F ,≤). A cooperative game in our model is a triple
(N,F , v), where v : F → R+ is some function that takes nonnegative real
values. We interpret the parameter v(S) as the value the feasible coalition S
can generate. As usual, we assume that v is normalized in the sense
v(∅) = 0 if ∅ ∈ F .
9
3.1 The Extended Game and the Core
While an arbitrary subset S ⊆ N of players need not form a feasible coali-
tion in its own right (i.e., S /∈ F), it is natural to assign to S the maxi-
mal possible value, non-overlapping feasible coalitions with players from S
could jointly achieve. So we define
v∗(S) = max{
k∑
i=1
v(Si) | Si ∈ F(S) and Si ∩ Sj = ∅ if i 6= j}.
Here we assume w.l.o.g. that the empty set is considered feasible, i.e., ∅ ∈ F
holds. Otherwise, we add ∅ as the new minimal element to F . So (N, v∗)
is a classical cooperative game, where v∗(S) is defined for all subsets S ⊆
N . We refer to (N, v∗) as the extension of the cooperative game (N,F , v).
Recall that the core of (N, v∗) is the following set of nonnegative allocation
vectors x ∈ RN :
core(v∗) = {x ≥ 0 | x(N) = v∗(N), x(S) ≥ v∗(S) for all S ⊆ N}
with the notation x(S) =
∑
p∈S x(p).
Lemma 3.1 Assume x ≥ 0. Then x ∈ core(v∗) holds if and only if
x(N) = v∗(N) and x(F ) ≥ v(F ) for all F ∈ F .
Proof. The condition is obviously necessary for x ≥ 0 to lie in core(v∗).
It is also sufficient because the nonnegativity of x implies for any subset
S ⊆ N and collection of pairwise disjoint feasible coalitions Si ∈ F(S):
x(S) ≥
∑
i
x(Si) ≥
∑
i
v(Si) .

We refer to the parameter v∗ = v∗(N) as the (total) value of the coop-
erative game (N,F , v) and define its core as
core(v) = {x ∈ RN+ |
∑
p∈N
x(p) = v∗,
∑
p∈S
x(p) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ F}.
Lemma 3.1 says that core(v) is identical with core(v∗), i.e., the core of
(N,F , v) coincides with the core of the extension (N, v∗).
We now establish the appropriate generalization of Shapley’s [20] con-
struction of core vectors for convex games to the present model.
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3.2 Monotone Convex Games
The cooperative game (N,F , v) is said to be monotone (increasing) if
S ≤ T =⇒ v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S, T ∈ F .
REMARK. v is monotone decreasing relative to (F ,≤) if v is monotone
increasing relative to the order dual (F ,≤d). Without loss of generality,
we take the term ”monotone” to mean monotone increasing in the following
discussion. The analogous statements for monotone decreasing functions
are obtained by simply dualizing the model.
The cooperative game (N,F , v) is said to be convex if
(Cv) For all S, T ∈ F with v(S) > 0 and v(T ) > 0, there exist coalitions
U, V ∈ F(S ∪ T ) such that
U ≤ S, T ≤ V and v(U) + v(V ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
The general form of Shapley’s theorem now becomes:
Theorem 3.1 Let (F ,≤) be a weakly submodular lattice of coalitions and
(N,F , v) a monotone convex cooperative game. Then core(v) 6= ∅. More-
over, a core vector can be constructed with a greedy algorithm.
It turns out that Frank’s [13] greedy algorithm can be used to construct
core vectors for monotone convex games. We will give a simplified proof
of its correctness and of Theorem 3.1 in the next section. Shapley [20] con-
siders the situation where F consists of all subsets of N and is ordered by
set-theoretic containment. Convexity there is meant to satisfy the inequality
v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N.
Shapley’s convex function v is assumed to be monotone increasing. In this
situation, one obviously has
v∗ = v(N)
and retrieves the classical results as special cases within our model.
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3.2.1 Extensions of Monotone Convex Games
A direct consequence of the definition is the observation that the extension
(N, v∗) of an arbitrary cooperative game (N,F , v) is monotone and subad-
ditive, i.e.,
S ⊆ T =⇒ v∗(S) ≤ v∗(T )
S ∩ T = ∅ =⇒ v∗(S) + v∗(T ) ≤ v∗(S ∪ T ).
One might suspect that the extension (N, v∗) of a convex game (N,F , v)
is a convex game in the classical sense (and hence a core vector could be
constructed with Shapley’s [20] procedure). However, this is not necessarily
the case as the next example shows.
Example 3.1 Let N = {a, b, c} and F = {∅, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}}.
Assume the order (F ,≤) to be given by (see Fig. 2)
{a, b} < {a, c} and S ≤ T if S ⊆ T .
The function v : F → R+ with v(∅) = v(a) = v(b) = v(c) = 0 and
v(a, b) = v(a, c) = 1 is monotone and convex. The extension v∗ yields
v∗(N) + v∗(a) = 1 < 2 = v∗(a, b) + v∗(a, c).
So the condition v∗(S ∪ T ) + v∗(S ∩ T ) ≥ v∗(S) + v∗(T ) is not satisfied.
{a,b} {a,c}
{a,b,c}
{}
{a} {b} {c}
{a,b}
{}
{a} {b} {c}
{b,c}
{a,c}
(N,v*)
0
(N,F,v)
Figure 2: The extension of a coalition structure
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A further problem we have not yet commented on arises from the com-
putation of the values v∗(S) of the extended game. Here, we assume that
a procedure (or ”oracle” v) is available that allows us to evaluate feasible
coalitions:
S ∈ F → v → v(S) .
There is no generally efficient method known that would allow us to
evaluate v∗(S) for arbitrary subsets S ⊆ N on the basis of an oracle for v.
The algorithms in the next section show, however, that the situation is much
better for monotone convex games. Given an oracle for v and an oracle
for finding a maximal feasible coalition M in a subcollection F(X) ⊆ F ,
we can efficiently evaluate the parameters v∗(S) and construct allocation
vectors in core(v) = core(v∗).
4 The Greedy Algorithm for Convex Games
We assume throughout that (F ,≤) is weakly submodular. We now compute
a heuristic value for v∗ in a straightforward fashion and then show that the
computation is exact under the hypothesis of Theorem 3.1.
4.1 The Monge Algorithm
The algorithm works with labels w(p) ∈ {0, 1} for the players p ∈ N . In
each iteration, labels are possibly reduced.
Assume that v is monotone and assign initially the label w(p) = 1 to
each of the players p ∈ N . The algorithm works as follows:
(M0) Let M be the maximal coalition of F and assume v(M) > 0. Choose
some player p∗ ∈ M as a representative. Reduce the labels of all
p ∈M by w(p∗). Set Π = {p∗} and replace F by
F∗ = {S ∈ F | v(S) > 0, p∗ /∈ S}.
(M1) Let M be the maximal coalition of F and choose some player p∗ ∈M
with smallest label w(p∗) as a representative. Reduce the labels of all
p ∈M by w(p∗) and update:
Π ← Π ∪ {p∗}, F ← F∗ = {S ∈ F | v(S) > 0, p∗ /∈ S}.
(M2) Iterate (M1) until F = ∅.
Since (F ,≤) is weakly submodular and v monotone increasing, the re-
duced set F∗ = {S ∈ F | v(S) > 0, p∗ /∈ S} admits indeed a unique
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maximal coalition (cf. Lemma 2.1). The maximal coalitions considered in
the course of the algorithm form a chain
M = {M1 < . . . < Mk} ⊆ F ,
where Mk is the maximal coalition in the original coalition structure F . We
refer toM as a Monge chain. The corresponding representatives pj ∈ Mj
constitute the set Π = {p1, . . . , pk}. The collection
P = {Mj ∈| w(pj) = 1}
of those coalitions where representatives p∗ with the label w(p∗) = 1 were
chosen must be pairwise disjoint since the algorithm always chooses a rep-
resentative with a currently minimal possible label. Moreover, each repre-
sentative pi ∈ Π belongs to some Mj ∈ P. So we find
Π ⊆
⋃
Mj∈P
Mj and v(P) =
∑
Mj∈P
v(Mj) ≤ v
∗. (4)
An important (technical) observation is the following:
Lemma 4.1 If S ∈ F satisfies S < Mj and S 6≤Mj−1, then pj ∈ S.
Proof. Assume that the Monge algorithm has already constructed the set
Π = {pk, . . . , pj+1} of representatives and Mj is the largest coalition with
Mj ∩ Π = ∅. Because of the consecutive property (C1), we know from
S < Mj < . . . < Mk that S ∩Π = ∅ must hold.
By (C2), there exists some V ∈ F(Mj−1 ∪ S) which strictly dominates
Mj−1. Now pj /∈ S would imply pj /∈ V , so that the Monge algorithm
should have chosen V instead of Mj−1 in the next iteration.

4.2 The Greedy Algorithm
Assume that v is monotone increasing and M = {M1 < . . . < Mk} the
Monge chain with set Π = {p1, . . . , pk} of representatives constructed by
the algorithm in the previous section. Given these data, the greedy algorithm
constructs an allocation vector x ∈ RN by an iterative procedure:
(G0) Let x(p) = 0 for all p ∈ N and modify x iteratively as follows.
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(G1) x(p1) = v(M1) and
x(pj) = v(Mj)−
∑
{x(pi) | i < j, pi ∈Mj} (j = 2, . . . , k).
Since no representative pi ∈ Mi with i > j belongs to Mj (by the al-
gorithmic construction of Mj), we immediately find for the resulting greedy
vector x:
x(Mj) =
∑
p∈Mj
xp = v(Mj) for all j = 1, . . . , k.
Lemma 4.2 x(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ N and
∑
p∈N
x(p) = v(P).
Proof. If the greedy algorithm does not modify the component x(p),
we have x(p) = 0. Now x(p1) = v(M1) ≥ 0 follows directly from (G1)
and the nonnegativity of v. The monotone property of v furthermore yields
inductively:
x(pj) = v(Mj)−
∑
{x(pi) | i < j, pi ∈Mj}
≥ v(Mj)−
∑
{x(pi) | pi ∈Mj−1}
= v(Mj)− v(Mj−1) ≥ 0.
From (4) we know Π ⊆ ⋃P. Since the coalitions in P are pairwise disjoint,
we thus find
∑
p∈N
x(p) =
∑
Mj∈P
∑
p∈Mj
x(p) =
∑
Mj∈P
v(Mj) = v(P).

Lemma 4.3 If v is monotone increasing and convex, then
x(S) =
∑
p∈S
x(p) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ F .
Proof. We already know x(S) = v(S) if S ∈ M. Consider now an
arbitrary S ∈ F \M and suppose that S were a minimal counterexample
to the claim of the Lemma. So v(S) > 0 must hold (otherwise x(S) ≥ 0 =
v(S) follows trivially). If S < M1, the Monge algorithm implies v(S) ≤ 0,
which would contradict the choice of S as a counterexample.
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Let j ≤ k be the smallest index such that S < Mj . If Mj−1 < S < Mj
for some index j. Then Lemma 4.1 guarantees pj ∈ S. Moreover, (C1)
implies
pi ∈ S if i < j and pi ∈Mj .
Hence we deduce from x ≥ 0 a contradiction to our choice of S:
x(S) ≥ x(Mj) = v(Mj) ≥ v(S).
In the remaining case S 6≥ Mj−1, the convexity of v guarantees coalitions
U, V ∈ F(S ∪Mj−1) with
U < S,Mj−1 < V and v(U) + v(V ) ≥ v(S) + v(Mj−1).
(C1) implies V ∩ {pj+1, . . . , pk} = ∅. So Mj−1 < V ≤ Mj holds, which
guarantees x(V ) ≥ v(V ) by the preceding argument. Moreover, x(U) ≥
v(U) is implied by the choice of S as a minimal counterexample. So the
submodularity of the nonnegative vector x ≥ 0 yields the contradiction
x(S) ≥ x(U) + x(V )− x(Mj−1)
≥ v(U) + v(V )− v(Mj−1) ≥ v(S).

Recalling the value v(P) ≤ v∗, computed in the previous section from
the Monge algorithm, we can now finish the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 4.4 Let v be convex and monotone increasing and x the greedy
vector computed from the Monge chainM with representative set Π. Then
v∗ = v(P) and x ∈ core(v).
Proof. In view of the preceding Lemmas, it suffices to establish the in-
equality v∗ ≤ v(P). So let P ′ = {S′1, . . . , S′`} be a v-optimal collection of
pairwise disjoint coalitions S′i. Then we find
v∗ = v(P ′) =
∑`
i=1
v(S′i) ≤
∑`
i=1
x(S′i) ≤
∑
p∈N
x(p) = v(P) ≤ v∗.

REMARK. Frank [13] proves that his algorithm actually solves the weighted
optimization problem
min
x≥0
∑
p∈N
w(p)x(p) s.t.
∑
p∈S x(p) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ F
for arbitrary weights w(p) ≥ 0 and convex decreasing v. The same can be
shown for our version of the algorithm.
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5 Cost Games
Assume that (N,F , c) is a cooperative cost game, where c : F → R+
describes the costs c(S) feasible coalitions S generate. In the classical situ-
ation, where F comprises all subsets S ⊆ N , it is well-known that each set
of vectors that occurs as the core of a cooperative cost game also occurs as
the core of a cooperative value game. So structural investigations into the
classical core do not need to distinguish between ”value games” and ”cost
games”.
In the present framework, this is no longer the case. In order to define the
core of the cost game (N,F , c), we introduce the total cost as the parameter
c∗ = min{
∑`
i=1
c(Si) | N ⊆
⋃`
i=1
Si, Si ∈ F}
and consider the corresponding nonnegative core-type allocations:
core(c) = {x ∈ RN+ |
∑
p∈N
x(p) = c∗,
∑
p∈S
x(s) ≤ c(S) for all S ∈ F}.
If the characteristic functions satisfy a modular equality and the cost
function c is submodular relative to that modular equality, i.e.,
c(U) + c(V ) ≤ c(S) + c(T )
holds for suitable U, V ∈ F(S ∪ T ), an analogue of Theorem 3.1 can be
established on the basis of the greedy algorithm of [12]. We will not go into
details here.
6 The Shapley Value
In the classical model, the Shapley value tries to assess the average marginal
value of a player (cf. [19], [18]). In our present model (N,F , v) of a coop-
erative game, however, the notion of the ”marginal value” of a player needs
some further clarification.
To this end, we consider an elimination sequence for N relative to the
coalition structure (F ,≤), which is a sequence pi = pkpk−1 . . . p1 of players
such that
pj ∈ Sj (j = k, k − 1, . . . , 1), (5)
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where Sk is the maximal coalition of F = F(N) and Sj is the maximal
coalition of
F(N \ {pk, . . . , pj+1}) = {S ∈ F | S ∩ {pk, . . . , pj+1} = ∅}.
It is natural to assess the marginal values ∂pi(p) of the players p ∈ N relative
to the elimination sequence pi = pk . . . p1 in the following fashion:
(ES) ∂pi(p1) = v(S1)
∂pi(pj) = v(Sj)−
∑
{∂pi(pi) | i < j, pi ∈ S} (j = 2, . . . , k)
∂pi(p) = 0 otherwise.
(ES) guarantees that the value of each coalition Sj associated with pi is
the sum of the corresponding marginal values:
v(Sj) =
∑
p∈Sj
∂pi(p) (j = 1, . . . , k).
As the Shapley value Φ(v) of the cooperative game (N,F , v) we pro-
pose the allocation vector that assigns to each player its average marginal
elimination value. Letting Π be the collection of all elimination sequences,
we thus have
Φp(v) =
1
|Π|
∑
pi∈Π
∂pi(p) for all p ∈ N. (6)
Theorem 6.1 Assume that (F ,≤) is a weakly submodular lattice and that
the cooperative game (N,F , v) is convex and monotone. Then Φ(v) ∈
core(v).
Proof. Under the hypotheses of the Theorem, the elimination sequences
are exactly the Monge sequences and the marginal elimination vectors are
the associated greedy vectors (see Section 4). Hence each of these lies in
core(v). SoΦ(v) is a convex combination of core vectors and thus a member
of the convex polyhedron core(v) as well.

If F consists of all subsets S ⊆ N , an elimination sequence relative to
(F ,⊆) is just a permutation pi = pnpn−1 . . . p1 of the ground set N . In this
case, the Shapley value given by (6) coincides with classical Shapley value.
It also extends other models for the Shapley value that have been proposed
in the literature.
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6.0.1 Precedence Constraints
As in Section 2.3.1, assume that a precedence structure (N,≤) on the set of
players is given. In the hierachical model of [8] the collections of maximal
elements of the ideal of (N ≤), i.e. the antichains of (N,≤), form the
relevant coalitions. The maximal coalition in the corresponding coalition
structure (A,≤) consists of the maximal elements of N . Let pn ∈ N be one
of them. Then the maximal coalition in A that does not contain pn is the set
max(N \ {pn}) etc. Hence the elimination sequences are exactly the linear
extensions of (N,≤), i.e., those permutations pi = pnpn−1 . . . p1 of N with
the property
pj is a maximal element of N \ {pn, . . . , pj+1} (j = n, . . . , 1).
A Shapley value is introduced axiomatically in [8]) and it is shown that
its computation amounts to (6) relative to the set of linear extensions of
(N,≤). Hence (6) also generalizes the Shapley value of cooperative games
with precedence constraints on the players.
6.0.2 Convex Geometries
Marginal operators and Shapley values are studied in [2] for cooperative
games (N,F , v), where F is a convex geometry (cf. Section 2.3.2). So
each non-empty coalition S ∈ F contains a feasible coalition T ⊂ S with
|S \ T | = 1. The Shapley value suggested in [1] is computed according to
the scheme (6) relative to the permutations pi = pnpn−1 . . . , p1 of N with
the property
N \ {pn . . . pj+1} = {p1, . . . , pj} ∈ F (j = n, . . . , 1). (7)
Every such permutation pi is also an elimination sequence in the sense
of (5). However, not every elimination sequence is of type (7). Hence our
approach will not necessarily result in the Shapley value of [2]. It turns out
that the dilemma is easily remedied by clarifying the model of games on
convex geometries.
Basing the definition of the marginal values of the players exclusively
on sequences of type (7) says implicitly that in a coalition S ∈ F only
those players are considered relevant and valuable that correspond to ex-
treme points in the geometric interpretation. Hence it appears appropriate to
model the cooperative game in question not on F but on the collection
ext(F) = {ext(S) | S ∈ F}
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with the induced order relation (ext(F),≤) as in Section 2.3.2. It is straight-
forward to check that the sequences of type (7) are precisely the elimination
sequences relative to (ext(F),≤) in the sense (5).
Final Remark. Note that our approach to the Shapley value does not re-
quire (F ,≤) to be a lattice. It thus provides a solution concept for very
general cooperative games with (possibly) restricted collections of feasi-
ble coalitions. Classes of combinatorial structures with particularly ”well-
behaved” elimination sequences are, e.g., greedoids (cf. [16]), of which
matroids are special cases.
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